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This paper extends the model of optimal income taxation due to Mirrlees (1971)
and includes private information on public goods preferences. A mechanism de-
sign approach is used to establish the following result: If policies are required to
be robustly implementable in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005), then the
optimality conditions in the extended model with uncertainty about tax and expen-
diture policies, are the same as in the standard model of optimal income taxation.
The paper provides a foundation for a widely used assumption in public nance,
namely that individuals optimize their behaviour subject to a predetermined and
commonly known tax system.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies income taxation and public goods provision under the assumption
that individuals have private information about their skills and about their preferences
for a public good. Traditionally, normative public economics has separated the analysis
of tax systems and the revelation of preferences for public goods. Most of the litera-
ture on optimal taxation ignores public goods and characterizes an optimal tax system
under the assumption that the government has an exogenously given funding require-
ment. Papers on income taxation which include public goods provision assume that
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1preferences for public goods are common knowledge. They focus on how the distortions
associated with taxation aect the level of public goods provision, under the premise
that a question such as \how many individuals have a high, medium or low valuation
of the public good" has already somehow been answered.1
By contrast, the literature on public goods provision under asymmetric information
focusses on the problem how to determine the social benet of a public good, given
that preferences of individuals are not observable. Moreover, this literature does not
allow for taxation as a source of funds.2
A joint treatment of these two problems is dicult because they are typically analyzed
in very dierent models. The theory of optimal taxation assumes a large economy in
which individuals act as \price-takers", i.e., they take the tax system and the provision
of public goods as given. The literature on the revelation of public goods preferences,
by contrast, is based on a \small" economy in which each single individual has a no-
ticeable impact on public goods provision.
This paper extends the large economy model of the theory of optimal income taxa-
tion so as to allow for incomplete information about the cross-section distribution of
preferences for a public good. Hence, it will be necessary to acquire information from
individuals to determine the social benets from public goods provision. In particular,
this implies that individuals face uncertainty about the tax and expenditure policy.
The main question is what dierences, if any, the privateness of information on public
goods preferences makes for optimal taxation and public goods provision.
The analysis uses a mechanism design approach. Each individual is asked to send a
message. The mechanism determines the public good provision level and the tax sys-
tem as a function of the prole of messages that it has received. By the Revelation
Principle an individual's message may be taken to consist of the individual's public
goods preference and the individual's skill level.
The set of implementable policies depends on the probabilistic beliefs of individuals
about the public good provision level and the shape of the tax system. Consequently,
alternative assumptions about individual beliefs lead to alternative tax and expenditure
policies. Given that there is no way of telling what \reasonable" beliefs are, this notion
of implementability is problematic. I therefore invoke the robustness requirement of
Bergemann and Morris (2005) so that a social choice function has to be implementable
for any set of beliefs that individuals might have.
Given this robustness requirement, I extend the Taxation Principle, due to Hammond
(1979) and Guesnerie (1995), to show that any mechanism is equivalent to a system
specifying a public good provision level and an income tax schedule as a function of
the cross-section distribution of preferences, which is such that, given the public good
1Examples are Atkinson and Stern (1974), Wilson (1991), Boadway and Keen (1993), Nava et al.
(1996), Sandmo (1998), Gaube (2000), Hellwig (2004), Kaplow (2006) or Gahvari (2006).
2Examples of this approach include Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet
(1979), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), Hellwig (2003), or Neeman (2004).
2provision level and the income tax schedule, each individual chooses labor supply to
maximize utility. No further incentive compatibility condition, e.g., on the communi-
cation of public goods preferences is involved.
The extended Taxation Principle has the following implication: the model with uncer-
tainty about optimal policies gives rise to the same optimality conditions for income
taxation and public goods provision as the existing literature which is based on a de-
terministic environment. The main nding can therefore be summarized as follows:
Given the robustness requirement of Bergemann and Morris (2005), the optimal tax
and expenditure policy for an economy with incomplete information on the desirability
of public goods provision, may be derived under the hypothesis that there is complete
information and that individuals behave optimally subject to a predetermined income
tax system and a predetermined public goods provision level.
The argument proceeds as follows: Attention is limited to social choice functions that
can be implemented as outcomes of anonymous games in a large economies. The re-
quirement of anonymity implies that all individuals with the same characteristics are
treated equally by the allocation mechanism. By an adaption of a result of Bergemann
and Morris (2005) I nd that a social choice function is robustly implementable if and
only if it is incentive compatible from an ex post perspective, i.e., the mechanism which
implements the social choice function must be such that, no individual has an incentive
to revise the own action after the actions of other individuals have been revealed.
From an ex post perspective, the distribution of preferences is known. Consequently,
robust mechanism design gives rise to the same implementability conditions as a model
with complete information on the distribution of preferences. For a complete infor-
mation environment, the Taxation Principle says that that any incentive compatible
allocation can be decentralized via a suitably chosen income tax system. Instead of
relying on a game where individuals send messages one may use a system where indi-
viduals choose their labor supplies under a given tax system.
These observations imply the extended Taxation Principle that is derived in this pa-
per: an admissible social choice function can be represented by a rule which species a
public good provision level and an income tax schedule as a function of the distribution
of public goods preferences. Whatever the distribution of public goods preferences,
the tax schedule has to be such that individual labor supply is utility maximizing. To
implement this outcome it is no longer possible to use a mechanism where a choice of
labor supply is the only action that is taken by individuals because the information on
public goods preferences needs to be transmitted to the policy maker. However, this
has no bearing on incentive compatible policies. In a large economy, no individual has
a noticeable impact on public good provision so that individuals are trivially willing to
reveal their public goods preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The Model is introduced in Section
2. Section 3 contains the characterization of robustly implementable tax and expen-
3diture policies. In Section 4, I briey discuss some recent related literature. The last
Section contains concluding Remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
A workhorse of public economics is the model of optimal income taxation due to Mirrlees
(1971). In the following, I introduce an extended version of this model with uncertainty
about the social benets of public goods provision.
Suppose that there is a continuum of individuals identied with the unit interval I =
[0;1]. The utility function of individual i is given by
ui = u(q;c;y;wi;i);
where q is the amount of a public good, c is the individual's consumption of private
goods, or, after-tax income, and y is the individual's contribution to the economy's
output, or, pre-tax income. It is assumed that the utility function u increases in q and
c and decreases in y.
wi is a skill parameter that aects how much eort an individual has to exert in order
to produce an additional unit of output. For each i, wi belongs to a nite ordered set
W = fw1;:::;wng. i is a taste parameter that aects an individual's valuation of the
public good and belongs to a nite ordered set  = f1;:::;mg.
A standard assumption in the theory of optimal income taxation is that the single
crossing property holds, i.e., at any point in a y c diagram, the slope of an individual's








for any k, any q, and any  2 . uc and uy are the partial derivatives of u with
respect to c and y, respectively. The interpretation is that a high-skilled individual
needs to exert less eort in order to produce additional output and hence needs less
compensation for a marginal increase in the output requirement.
A standard assumption in the theory of public goods under incomplete information is
that an individual's willingness to give up private goods for an increase in public good









for any l, any y, and any w 2 W.
For instance, if preferences take the additively separable form
u(q;c;y;w;) = v(q;) + V (c;y;w); (3)
then these properties hold if the function V satises the single crossing property and
the function v is such that the marginal utility that an individual derives from the
4public good is increasing in , vq(q;l) < vq(q;l+1).
The informational structure is as follows. Individuals have private information about
their skill levels and their taste parameters. There is a commonly known cross-section
distribution of skill levels f = (f1;:::;fn), where fk is the population share of individ-
uals with skill level wk. Hence, regarding the distribution of skill parameters, there is
no uncertainty at the aggregate level.
Uncertainty about the distribution of public goods preferences arises via the joint dis-
tribution of taste and productivity parameters. This distribution depends on the state
of the economy which is taken to be the realization of a random variable ~ s that takes
values in a set S. For a given state s 2 S, let sk = (sk1;:::;skm) be the distribution
of taste parameters among individuals with skill level wk, i.e., skl is the fraction of
individuals with skill level wk who have a taste parameter l. A state of the economy s
is characterized by such a conditional distribution for each skill level and can be written
as s = (sk)n
k=1.
To give an example, let W = fw1;w2g and  = f1;2g. The information structure
is such that the fractions f1 and f2 of low-skilled and high-skilled individuals in the
population are common knowledge. Uncertainty about the state of the economy arises
because the fraction of high-skilled individuals with a high valuation of the public good,
s22, and the fraction of low-skilled individuals with a high valuation of the public good,
s12, are random quantities.
Existing models in the theory of optimal income taxation can be viewed as special
cases of this environment which have in common that there is no uncertainty about
public goods preferences. For instance, Atkinson and Stern (1974) consider a model
with a representative individual whose utility function is known. Boadway and Keen
(1993) or Gahvari (2006) consider a model in which individuals dier only in their
productive abilities. If an individual's skill level is known, then the utility function of
the individual and, in particular, his preference for the public good, is known as well.
Hence, public goods preferences are not a genuine source of heterogeneity among indi-
viduals. Moreover, at an aggregate level, since the distribution f of skill parameters
in the population is known, the distribution of public goods preferences is also known.
This implies that there is no problem of information aggregation that complicates the
decision on an optimal supply of public goods.
I use a mechanism design approach to characterize the allocations, or social choice func-
tions that can be implemented. A social choice function consists of a provision rule for
the public good q : s 7! q(s) that species for each state s how much of the public good
is provided, and a pair of functions c : (s;w;) 7! c(s;w;) and y : (s;w;) 7! y(s;w;),
which determine for each state, each skill level, and each taste parameter a consump-
tion level and an output requirement, respectively. A social choice function is said to






(y(s;wk;l)   c(s;wk;l))skl  r(q(s)) ; (4)
where r is an increasing and convex cost function which captures the resource require-
ment of public good provision.
I limit attention to social choice functions that can be implemented by an anonymous
game.3 In the present setting, anonymity means that the decision on public good pro-
vision is left unaected by a permutation of individual actions. For consumption levels
and output requirements, anonymity holds provided that all individuals who choose
the same action get the same y   c bundle, and that the menu of available bundles
is also unaected by a permutation of actions. The interpretation is that attention is
limited to institutional arrangements which satisfy an equal treatment condition.
Formally, an anonymous allocation mechanism M = (A;Q;C;Y ) species an action
set A and a collection of functions, where Q :  7! Q() gives the level of public good
provision as a function of the cross-section distribution of actions , and the functions
C : (;a) 7! C(;a) and Y : (;a) 7! Y (;a) specify a consumption level and an
output requirement as a function of an individual's message a and of the distribution
of messages .
A social choice function is called implementable if there is some anonymous mecha-
nism such that, in every state s, the equilibrium allocation is equal to the allocation
stipulated by the social choice function. Formally, suppose that  : W   ! A is
an equilibrium strategy for the game induced by M and let (s) be the cross-section
distribution of actions induced by strategy  in state s. The mechanism M is said to
implement the social choice function (q;c;y), if for all s,
Q((s)) = q(s)
and
C((s);(w;)) = c(s;w;) and Y ((s);(w;)) = y(s;w;) ;
for all (w;).
The set of implementable social choice functions depends on the equilibrium concept
that is used. In the following section I will rst provide a characterization of the social
choice functions that are robustly implementable in the sense of Bergemann and Morris
(2005). I will then prove a Taxation Principle which relates the set of implementable
social choice functions to the set of outcomes that can be reached with an income tax
system.
3For a more extensive discussion of anonymous games, see Kalai (2004).
63 Robust Mechanism Design and the Taxation Principle
3.1 Robust Mechanism Design
For the given environment, a \natural" solution concept is as follows: a social choice
function is said to be implementable if it can be made the equilibrium allocation of
a game of incomplete information, i.e., individual behaviour must be optimal from an
interim perspective where individuals know their own characteristics but have only
probabilistic beliefs about the characteristics and the behavior of others. Following
Bergemann and Morris (2005), I refer to this as implementability as an interim Nash
equilibrium.4
A diculty with the notion of implementability as an interim Nash equilibrium is that it
requires assumptions on individual beliefs about the state ~ s of the economy and possibly
also about higher order beliefs, i.e., beliefs about the beliefs of other individuals, etc.
Given that any specic assumption on the beliefs of individuals is hard to defend, I
follow Bergemann and Morris (2005) and require that the set of possible outcomes
should be robust with respect to the specication of individual beliefs, i.e., a social
choice function is required to be implementable as an interim Nash equilibrium for any
set of beliefs that individuals may have.
An alternative solution concept is implementability as an ex post equilibrium. This
requires that there is an equilibrium  such that after the distribution of actions by
all other players has been revealed, no player would be willing to choose an action that
diers from the one initially chosen.5 Formally,  is an ex post equilibrium for the game
induced by mechanism M = (A;Q;C;Y ) if, for all s 2 S, and for all (w;) 2 W  ,
(w;) 2 argmaxa2A u(Q((s));C((s);a);Y ((s);a);w;):
For a given set of individual beliefs, this notion is stronger than the requirement of
implementability as an interim Nash equilibrium. It requires that each individual has
an action that is a best response for each possible state of the economy. An interim Nash
equilibrium requires only that the equilibrium action is a best response \on average",
when forming expectations about ~ s. Hence, the notion of an ex post equilibrium may
be criticized because it gives a too restrictive view on the tax and expenditure policies
that can be achieved under conditions of private information on skill levels and public
goods preferences.6
However, the main result of Bergemann and Morris (2005) is that the set of robustly
4If one adds the assumption that individual beliefs are derived according to Bayes' rule from some
common prior distribution this yields the special case of implementability as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
5In the given environment, implementability in an ex post equilibrium is equivalent to implementabil-
ity in a dominant strategy equilibrium. This equivalence holds in models with private values, where
the private information of some individual i is not directly payo relevant for some other individual j.
See Bergemann and Morris (2005) for details.
6For instance, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem provides conditions such that only dictatorial
social choice functions are implementable as an ex post equilibrium. This however requires that there
is no domain restriction on preferences; see Samuelson (1967) for a discussion of this requirement.
7implementable social choice functions and the set of ex post implementable social choice
functions coincide, i.e., if we allow for mechanisms that exploit the belief structure of
individuals, but at the same time insist that implementation is possible whatever those
beliefs are, then we can not enlarge the set of implementable social choice functions
relative to those that are implementable as an ex post equilibrium.
A formal derivation of this result for the large economy model in this paper is relegated
to the Appendix because it requires a substantial investment in notation.7 The main
logic is as follows. If a social choice function is implementable for any set of beliefs,
then, in particular, it must be implementable in a \complete information environment"
where all individuals \know" (assign probability 1 to) the true state of the economy.
This implies that a robustly implementable social choice function is also implementable
as an ex post equilibrium. The converse implication holds because implementability as
an ex post equilibrium means that a social choice function can be made the outcome
of a game in which individuals have an action that is a best response in each possible
state s. Trivially, this implies that this action is also a best response if the same game
form is used to implement the social choice function, but individuals have incomplete
information and take expectations about ~ s.
3.2 Incentive Compatible Social Choice Functions
Given the equivalence between robustly implementable social choice functions and those
that are implementable as an ex post equilibrium, I will in the following focus on the
latter. Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 below clarify how the requirement of imple-
mentability as an ex post equilibrium restricts the set of social choice functions.
Proposition 1 Suppose that a mechanism M = (A;Q;C;Y ) implements the so-
cial choice function (q;c;y) in an ex post equilibrium. Then, a mechanism M0 =
(A0;Q0;C0;Y 0) with A0 = W   which is such that, for all s,
Q0(s) = q(s)
and
C0(s;w;) = c(s;w;) and Y 0(s;w;) = y(s;w;) ;
for all (w;), has an ex post equilibrium 0, where 0(;w) = (;w), for all (;w).
Proposition 1 is a Revelation Principle for a large economies: if there exists some
anonymous game with the property that the equilibrium allocation coincides with the
social choice function, then there is also a direct mechanism, i.e., a mechanism such
that the action set A is equal to the set of types W , that reaches the social choice
7In particular, one has to enrich the denition of a type in such a way that this includes not only
the individual's skill level and taste parameter but also the individual's beliefs about the types of other
individuals.
8function in an equilibrium where all individuals follow a strategy of truth-telling.8 A
more concise way of stating this observation is given in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 A social choice function (q;c;y) is implementable in an ex post equilib-
rium if and only if it satises the following incentive compatibility constraints: For all
s, for all (;w), and for all (^ ; ^ w),
u(q(s);c(s;w;);y(s;w;);w;)  u(q(s);c(s; ^ w; ^ );y(s; ^ w; ^ );w;): (5)
The incentive compatibility constraints are interpreted as follows: Individuals choose
their announcements to the mechanism designer ex interim, i.e., after having learned
their own characteristics but without knowing s. Now consider an ex post perspec-
tive, where the state s of the economy has been revealed to individuals, and suppose
that after s has become known, individuals were given the opportunity to revise their
announcement to the mechanism. If the inequalities in (5) hold, then, whatever the
value of s, no individual would benet from choosing an announcement that diers
from truth-telling.
The large economy specication implies that an individual has no impact on the dis-
tribution of actions in the revelation game and hence on public good provision: q(s)
appears both on the left hand side and on the right hand side of (5). Individuals thus
act as \price-takers," in the sense of taking the state of the economy s that is perceived
by the mechanism designer and hence the amount of the public good as given. This is
a crucial dierence to the literature on public goods in \small" economies where each
individual can inuence how much of a public good is provided.
The following Proposition establishes that if preferences are additively separable then
incentive compatibility requires, in addition, that individuals who have the same skill
level but dier in their public goods preferences are treated equally in terms of the
consumption that they receive and the output they have to provide.
Proposition 2 Let u(q;c;y;w;) = v(q;) + V (c;y;w) : The social choice function
(q;c;y) is ex post individually incentive compatible if and only if the following two
properties are satised:
i) Individuals who dier only in their public goods preferences but have identical
skills are treated equally; i.e., for all s, for all w and for every pair  and 0,
V (c(s;w;);y(s;w;);w) = V (c(s;w;0);y(s;w;0);w) : (6)
8There is a degree of freedom for the construction of the mechanism M
0. It is required only that
individuals prefer truth-telling in response to truth-telling of all other individuals. Hence, it can be left
open what outcomes M
0 species in situations where the distribution of actions 
0 is such that there
is no state s 2 S with 
0 = s.
9ii) For any given taste parameter, an individual with skill level w, prefers the bundle
(c(s;;w);y(s;;w)) over the bundle (c(s;;w0);y(s;;w0)); i.e., for all s, for all
 and for every pair w and w0,
V (c(s;w;);y(s;w;);w)  V (c(s;w0;);y(s;w0;);w) : (7)
In the theory of optimal income taxation, the inequalities in (7) are known as self-
selection constraints.9 They ensure that, for given , each skill type chooses the \right"
c   y pair from the menu f(c(s;w;);y(s;w;))gw2W
The equalities in (6) imply that taste parameters can not be used as a screening device.
Individuals who dier only with respect to their preferences for the public good get the
same private goods consumption and the same output requirement.10 Hence, the tax
system cannot discriminate individuals according to their willingness to pay for public
goods. The reason is that each individual takes the decision on public good provision
as given and that an individuals' marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure is not aected by the public good.
The crucial idea in the mechanism design literature on public goods provision in the
tradition of Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), or d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet (1979) is
that payments are calibrated in such a way that individuals reveal their preferences.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 show that this idea becomes inapplicable. In a large
economy, individuals can not aect how much of the public good is provided. Moreover,
with separable preferences, dierences in public goods preferences can not be used as
a screening device. Taken together, these two facts imply that the tax system can only
exploit dierences in productive abilities.
3.3 The extended Taxation Principle
I now turn to the main result of the paper. The following Proposition, which I refer
to as the extended Taxation Principle, relates the social choice functions that can be
reached via some arbitrary allocation mechanism to those that can be decentralized by
means of a suitably chosen income tax system.
Proposition 3 A social choice function (q;c;y) satises the resource constraint (4)
and is incentive compatible if and only if there exists a function  : (s;y) 7! (s;y)
satisfying the following properties, for every s 2 S:
i) Consumption equals after tax income: for every (w;),
c(s;w;) = y(s;w;)   (s;y(s;w;)):
9See, for instance, Stiglitz (1982) or Boadway and Keen (1993).
10The proposition only says that utility levels are the same. For an ecient allocation, the
joint utility level of individuals with  and 




10ii) Individuals maximize utility subject to the given income tax schedule, i.e. for
every (w;),
y(s;w;) 2 argmaxy u(q(s);y   (s;y);y;w;): (8)




l=1 (y(s;wk;l))skl  r(q(s)) :
Proposition 3 gives the implications of implementability as an ex post equilibrium for
the analysis of tax systems. The postulate that individual behavior in a revelation
game is a best response, for each possible state s, translates into the requirement that
an individual's choice of pre-tax income y is utility maximizing given a tax system
(s;) that depends on the state of economy. Put dierently, individuals are assumed
to choose y as if they knew the state s and therefore the income tax system that relates
after-tax income to pre-tax income in state s.
In particular, this implies that the uncertainty about the state ~ s and hence about
public expenditures and the shape of the tax system do not aect individual behavior.
For instance, risk attitudes do not aect the set of admissible tax systems because
individuals are assumed to behave as if they knew the realization of ~ s.
As a consequence, existing models of optimal income taxation with a commonly known
state of the economy and the present model have the same constraints on the set of
admissible policies, and lead to the same characterization of optimal tax systems and
provision rules for the public good. The large economy specication implies that no
individual can aect the state of the economy as perceived by the policy maker, i.e.,
individuals take s as given when undertaking their choices. As a consequence, there
is no constraint such that the tax system and the expenditure policy chosen for some
state s would restrict the set of admissible tax systems and expenditure policies for
some other state s0. Hence, even if the distribution of public goods preferences ~ s is
a random quantity, an optimal social choice function requires that, for each possible
realization s 2 S, welfare is maximized subject to the feasibility constraint and the
constraint that individual labor supply is utility maximizing given the tax system.
However, the models dier in the following sense: In the standard model without
aggregate uncertainty, the mechanism that implements the social choice function can
be such that individuals are confronted with a tax system and the choice of labor
supply is the only action that they take. In the extended model by contrast, prior
to the operation of the tax system the state of the economy has to be determined.
This requires an initial phase of information aggregation that enables the mechanism
designer to determine s. However, this need to learn s does not generate an incentive
problem. Imposing that individual behavior is utility maximizing under the nally
chosen tax system is both necessary and sucient for incentive compatibility.
114 Discussion
The previous analysis has been based on a large economy model in which no single
individual has a noticeable impact on the policy maker's perception of the state of his
economy and hence on the policy that is implemented. Hence, there is no reason for
individuals to communicate their public goods preferences in a strategic manner and
incentive compatibility conditions refer only to the labor supply decisions of individu-
als.
However, individuals may also be willing to lie about their public goods preferences.
Recall from Proposition 2 that, with additively separable preferences, individuals who
have the same skills and dier only in their public goods preference are treated equally.
This implies that, with a direct mechanism, individuals are willig to announce any taste
parameter. Consequently, if s is the true distribution of public goods preferences, then
every prole of taste announcements ^ s is consistent with individual actions being a best
response from an ex post perspective.11
This raises the question whether incentive compatibility is really a sucient condition
for the implementability of a social choice function. There are some recent papers in
public economics that use a mechanism design approach and address this question.
Below, I briey discuss the dierent approaches and argue that they do not upset the
main result of this paper, i.e., the standard deterministic model of optimal income tax-
ation is robust in the sense that incomplete information per se does not imply that the
characterization of optimal tax and expenditure policies needs to be revised.
Bassetto and Phelan (2008) and Kocherlakota and Phelan (2007) study problems of
optimal taxation in a large economy with aggregate uncertainty. They are concerned
with the problem that a direct revelation game may give rise to multiple equilibria.12
They take an agnostic approach and assume that the policy maker has no device for
making an equilibrium selection. As a consequence they propose to evaluate social
choice functions using a maximin objective function so that the worst possible outcome
should be made as attractive as possible.
Bierbrauer and Hellwig (2008) study public goods provision in a large economy with
aggregate uncertainty and Bierbrauer (2007) studies optimal income taxation and pub-
lic goods provision in such a model. These papers argue that imposing only incentive
compatibility may give rise to implausible results. For instance, individuals may better
o if a public good is not provided, but are still assumed to communicate their pref-
erences in such a way that (innitesimally) they increase the probability of provision.
However, since it is also a best response to communicate preferences such that public
good provision becomes less likely the assumption of truth-telling is problematic. To
11We may assume that individuals will reveal their skills truthfully in any state s because of the
self-selection constraints. Hence, multiplicity is an issue only with respect to the announced prole of
public goods preferences.
12The general question whether it is possible to implement a social choice function as a unique
equilibrium of some, possibly non-direct, mechanism has been studied before in the mechanism design
literature; see Jackson (2001) or Moore (1992) for an overview.
12avoid this kind of situation, Bierbrauer and Hellwig (2008) and Bierbrauer (2007) allow
subcoalitions of individuals to coordinate on an equilibrium that is benecial for them
but has detrimental consequences from a welfare perspective, and develop a notion of
implementation as a coalition-proof equilibrium.
However, mechanisms based on sampling provide a straightforward solution to these
problems of equilibrium multiplicity on the one hand and multiple best responses on
the other hand. Such a mechanism can implement a social choice function in a unique
ex post equilibrium in which individuals have a unique best response.13 The idea is
rst to draw a random sample of individuals for the purpose of preference elicitation.
Based on this information, the decision on tax and expenditure policies is taken, and
the individuals who have not been in the sample choose their labor supply subject to
the given tax system.
This brief discussion can be summarized as follows: the papers mentioned above em-
phasize that individuals can coordinate their reactions to public policy in a way that
restricts the set of admissible social choice functions. Empirically, this is a very plausi-
ble restriction and it is certainly interesting to study the implications of this approach.
However, the literature based on sampling mechanisms shows that equilibrium multi-
plicity is not an inevitable implication of an environment with aggregate uncertainty.
This implies that one can determine the optimal tax and expenditure policy as in a
standard public economics model with no aggregate uncertainty.
5 Concluding Remarks
The theory of optimal income taxation studies welfare maximizing tax policies for an
environment where the distribution of abilities is known but individual abilities are
unobservable. The theory of public goods under asymmetric information studies opti-
mal allocations for an environment where the distribution of preferences is unknown.14
This paper has analyzed a large economy model that combines a known distribution of
abilities with an unknown distribution of public goods preferences.
It has been found that an unknown distribution of public goods preferences is not a
binding constraint. In a large economy, no individual can aect spending decisions that
are based on an aggregate such as the cross-section distribution of preferences. Conse-
quently, individuals have no incentive to hide their true public goods preference. In a
system with millions of individuals the idea that any one individual may be pivotal for
expenditure decisions and that this should be reected in the individual's tax payment
becomes moot.
However, uncertainty about preferences induces randomness into optimal tax and ex-
13The idea of a sampling mechanism has been introduced by Green and Laont (1979). A more
recent application is Gary-Bobo and Jaaidane (2000). Details on how to apply this idea to a model
with both skill and taste heterogeneity can be found in Bierbrauer and Sahm (2008).
14The typical model has utility functions that are linear in money so that utility is perfectly trans-
ferrable. As a consequence, knowing the cross-section distribution is sucient for an optimal decision
on public good provision, even if individual preferences are unknown.
13penditure policies. We introduced the requirement that a policy mechanism must not
be based on assumptions about the individuals' perception of this randomness. This
notion of robustness was then shown to imply that policy mechanisms have to be de-
signed as if individuals knew the true distribution of preferences. The analysis hence
provides a foundation for a widely used assumption in public nance, namely that
individuals optimize their behaviour subject to a given tax system.
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A Appendix
A.1 Characterization of robustly implementable social choice func-
tions
An individual is from now on characterized by a preference parameter, a productivity
level, beliefs about the the distribution of these characteristics in the economy and
beliefs about the beliefs of other individuals. These data are summarized in an ex-
tended type space T := [T;;], where T is the set of extended types,  : t 7! (t) =
(w(t);(t)), is a mapping that species the skill level and the taste parameter for an
individual with extended type t. For brevity, I refer to the the pair (t) := (w(t);(t))
as the payo type of type t and denote the set of possible payo types by   := W .
 : t 7! (t) species the beliefs of an an individual of type t with respect to the
cross-section distribution of extended types; i.e., (t)[X] is the probability that this
individual assigns to the event \the cross-section distribution of extended types, ,
belongs to a set X of probability distributions on T".
An extended type space introduces an additional source of heterogeneity among indi-
viduals, namely their beliefs about the state s of the economy, but also their higher
order beliefs, i.e., their beliefs about the beliefs of other individuals, and so on. Given
this enriched description of individuals, I now allow for more sophisticated mechanisms
which may depend on the beliefs of individuals.15
A strategy ^  in the game that is induced by some mechanism M = (A;Q;C;Y ) is now
viewed as a function that species for each extended type t an action ^ (t) 2 A. ^  is an
interim Nash equilibrium for the game induced by M on a given type space T , if for
every t and every a,
^ (t) 2 argmaxa2A
Z
T
U(Q(^ ());C(^ ();a);Y (^ ();a);(t))d(t) ; (9)
where T denotes the set of probability distributions on T, and ^ () is the distribution
of actions that is induced by ^  if the distribution of extended types is  2 T.
Every type space T is associated with a cross-section distribution of public goods
preferences, sT and a cross-section distribution of extended types T . A social choice
function (q;c;y) is said to be implementable as an interim Nash equilibrium on a given
type space T if there is a mechanism M = (A;Q;C;Y ) with an interim Nash equilibrium
^  that satises
Q(^ (T )) = q(sT )
15Note that, by denition, a social choice function does not depend on the beliefs of individuals.
As in Bergemann and Morris (2005), there must the same economic outcome in two situations where
individuals have the same utility functions but dier in their beliefs.
16and
C(^ (T ); ^ (t)) = C(sT ;w(t);(t)) and Y (^ (T ); ^ (t)) = y(sT ;w(t);(t));
for every t.
Proposition 4 A social choice function is implementable as an interim Nash equilib-
rium on every type space if and only if it is incentive compatible.
Proof Along similar lines as for Proposition 1 one can show that a social choice
function (q;c;y) is implementable as an interim Nash equilibrium by some mechanism
M on a given type space T if and only if it is truthfully implementable, i.e., if and only
if their exists a direct mechanism M0 with an action set A0 = T and outcome functions
Q0 :  7! Q0(), C0 : (;t) 7! C0(;t), and Y 0 : (;t) 7! Y 0(;t) such that




u(Q0();C0(;t0);Y 0(;t0);(t))d(t) : (10)
ii) The equilibrium allocation is equal to the social choice function,
Q0(T ) = q(sT ) (11)
and
C0(T ;t) = c(sT ;t) and Y 0(T ;t) = y(sT ;t) ; (12)
for every t.
We will show that a social choice function is ex post individually incentive compatible
if and only if it is truthfully implementable as an interim Nash equilibrium on every
extended type space T .
\(=": Given an incentive compatible social choice function (q;c;y) and given an ex-
tended types space T , construct a direct mechanism (T;Q0;C0;Y 0) such that (11) and






s ^ (t)[s]u(q(s);c(s;(t0));y(s;(t0));(t)) ;
where ^ (t)[s] :=
R
f2Tj1=sg d(t), and 1 denotes the marginal cross-section distri-
bution of payo types associated . Equivalently, for every t,
(t) 2 argmax02 
P
s ^ (t)[s]u(q(s);c(s;0);y(s;0);(t)) :
17This follows from the fact that (q;c;y) is incentive compatible.
\=)": If (q;c;y) is truthfully implementable as an interim Nash equilibrium on every
extended type space, then [Q;C;Y ] is, in particular, truthfully implementable on every
complete information type space; i.e., on every type space T which is such that, for
all t, ^ (t)[s] = 1, for some given s. If a direct mechanism (T;Q0;C0;Y 0) truthfully
implements (q;c;y) on such a type space then it must be true that (11) and (12)
hold for this type space. Using these conditions to substitute for Q0, C0, and Y 0, the
equilibrium conditions in (10) becomes: for all t and all t0,
u(q(s);c(s;(t));y(s;(t));(t))  u(q(s);c(s;(t0));y(s;(t0));(t)) ;
or, equivalently, for all  and 0,
u(q(s);c(s;);y(s;);)  u(q(s);c(s;0);y(s;0);) :
Since the choice of s0 was arbitrary, the latter inequality holds for any possible value of
s. Hence, (q;c;y) is ex post individually incentive compatible.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose the Proposition is false, then there exist s, (w;) and ( ^ w; ^ ) such that
u(q(s);c(s;w;);y(s;w;);w;) < u(q(s);c(s; ^ w; ^ );y(s; ^ w; ^ );w;):
Since M implements (q;c;y) this inequality can be equivalently written as
u(Q((s));C((s);(w;));Y ((s);(w;));w;)
< u(Q((s));C((s);( ^ w; ^ ));Y ((s);( ^ w; ^ ));w;)
This yields a contradiction to the assumption that  is an ex post equilibrium for the
game induced by M.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
To prove the only if-part note that both the inequalities in (7) and the equalities
in (6) are implied by incentive compatibility. To prove the if-part, consider a social
choice function such that the inequalities in (7) and the equalities in (6) hold, but
individual incentive compatibility fails. Then there exist (w;) and ( ^ w; ^ ) and s such
that V (c(s;;w);y(s;;w);w) < V (c(s; ^ w; ^ );y(s; ^ w; ^ );w). Using (6) and (7) one has:
V (c(s; ^ w; ^ );y(s; ^ w; ^ );w) = V (c(s; ^ w; ^ );y(s; ^ w;);w)
 V (c(s;;w);y(s;;w);w) :
Hence, a contradiction.
18A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
"(=": Consider a feasible social choice function (q;c;y). Suppose that a tax function
 satisfying properties i) - iii) exists. Suppose that (q;c;y) is not incentive compatible.
Then there exist s, (w;), and ( ^ w; ^ ) such that
u(q(s);c(s;w;);y(s;w;);w;) < u(q(s);c(s; ^ w; ^ );y(s; ^ w; ^ );w;):
Using the tax function  this is equivalent to
u(q(s);y(s;w;)   (y(s;w;));y(s;w;);w;)
< u(q(s);y(s; ^ w; ^ )   (y(s; ^ w; ^ ));y(s; ^ w; ^ );w;) :
But this contradicts that 8s;8(w;):
y(s;w;) 2 argmaxy u(q(s);y   (s;y);y;;w)
"=)": Consider a feasible and incentive compatible social choice function (q;c;y) and
construct  as follows: For any x such that there is s and (w;) with y(s;w;) = x,
dene (s;x) by the equation16
(s;x) = y(s;w;)   c(s;w;) :
Given this function , consumption equals after tax income and budget balance holds.
For all other levels of x set (s;x) = x.17
Now suppose this function  does not satisfy the property that 8s;8(w;):
y(s;w;) 2 argmaxy u(q(s);y   (s;y);y;;w)
Then there exist (w;);( ^ w; ^ ) and s such that
u(q(s);y(s;w;)   (y(s;w;));y(s;w;);w;)
< u(q(s);y(s; ^ w; ^ )   (y(s; ^ w; ^ ));y(s; ^ w; ^ );w;) ;
or, using that for all (w;), c(s;w;) = y(s;w;)   (s;y(s;w;)),
u(q(s);c(s;w;);y(s;w;);w;) < u(q(s);c(s; ^ w; ^ );y(s; ^ w; ^ );w;):
This contradicts incentive compatibility.
16Note that his equation uniquely determines (s;x). If not, one would have, for given s, dierent
consumption levels corresponding to the same income requirement; hence, a contradiction to incentive
compatibility.
17It is implicitly assumed that, for any agent, zero consumption implies a utility level of  1 and that
hence the corresponding y is never chosen, whenever there is an alternative with positive consumption
available.
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